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ABSTRACT 
Accumulating infections of highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza in humans underline the need to 
track the ability of these viruses to spread among humans. A human-transmissible avian influenza 
virus is expected to cause clusters of infections in humans living in close contact groups. Therefore, 
epidemiological analysis of infection clusters in human households is of key importance. Infection 
clusters may arise from (i) transmission events from humans who were infected by animals (primary 
human-to-human transmission), or (ii) transmission events from humans who were themselves 
infected by humans (secondary human-to-human transmission). Here we propose a method of 
analysing household infection data to detect changes in the transmissibility of avian influenza viruses 
in humans at an early stage. The method is applied to an outbreak of H7N7 avian influenza virus in 
the Netherlands that was the cause of more than 30 human-to-human transmission events. The 
analyses indicate that secondary human-to-human transmission is plausible for the Dutch household 
infection data. Based on the estimates of the within-household transmission parameters we evaluate 
the effectiveness of antiviral prophylaxis, and conclude that it is unlikely that all household infections 
can be prevented with current antiviral drugs. We discuss the applicability our method for the 
detection of emerging human-to-human transmission of avian influenza viruses in particular, and for 
the analysis of within-household infection data in general. 
 
NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY 
Recent outbreaks of emerging diseases such as SARS and H5N1 avian influenza have underlined 
that animal pathogens may acquire the ability to spread efficiently in humans. Monitoring the 
transmissibility of pathogens from the animal reservoir in humans is key for early detection of 
epidemic spread, and effective control. Here we have used data from a small but well-defined study 
of H7N7 avian influenza virus transmission in human households in order to estimate the 
transmissibility of H7N7 avian influenza in humans living in close contact. The analyses make use of 
household final size data (i.e. the number of individuals in the household that are ultimately infected) 
which, for many pathogens, are easily collected. For the H7N7 data the analyses indicate that the 
transmission chain in humans may well have extended beyond the first generation of infections in 
humans, and that less than half of the household infections could have been prevented by antiviral 
prophylaxis. Our method of analysis provides a rapid and generally applicable tool that can be used 
to monitor emerging human transmissibility of pathogens from the animal reservoir.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
Outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza (H5N1) in Southeast Asia, Europe and Africa have 
devastating consequences for poultry [1,2], and have resulted in numerous infections in humans [3-
5]. Although these infections from the animal reservoir continue to accumulate, the virus does not 
seem to spread extensively among humans. Nevertheless, fear is that these human infections may 
ultimately spark an influenza pandemic [6-9]. Indeed, recent clusters of infections in human 
households hint at the possibility of virus transmission from humans that were infected by poultry to 
their household contacts [10,11]. These suggestions are strengthened by the observation of 
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mutations in recent H5N1 viruses that seem to predispose the virus for more efficient transmission in 
mammals, including humans [12-16] (but see [17-18]). 
It is likely that a virus with pandemic potential will present itself initially through an increase in the 
number of infections in humans that have been in close contact with the case infected by animals. 
Therefore, rapid detection and control of clusters of infections is of key importance [7,9]. Such 
clusters may result from (i) multiple introductions from the animal reservoir (zoonotic transmission), 
(ii) multiple transmission events from humans who were infected by animals (primary human-to-
human transmission), or (iii) multiple transmission events from humans who were themselves 
infected by humans (secondary human-to-human transmission). Obviously, evidence for (iii) is the 
most worrisome as it indicates that the virus has acquired the ability to spread efficiently in humans. 
It is often thought that pathogens from the animal reservoir that have made the jump to a new host 
species are usually not (yet) well adapted for sustained transmission in the new host, and that 
transmissibility in a new species will gradually increase over time by the process of adaptation by 
means of natural selection [19-23]. Interestingly, however, in case of H5N1 avian influenza in 
humans the evidence so far does not seem to fit this prediction [22-24]. Mechanisms that could be 
responsible for the lack of efficient secondary human-to-human transmission could be due to a dose 
effect whereby humans infected by animals receive a higher infection dose than humans infected by 
humans, or to behavioural changes after infection that limit spread of the virus after it has been 
detected. 
In this paper we develop a method to detect and quantify different routes of virus transmission in a 
household setting. Our main aim is to investigate whether within-household pathogen transmission 
has been restricted to transmission from the primary infected individual or whether there is evidence 
that the transmission chain has extended beyond the first generation of infections. Our analyses are 
based on theoretical developments on the distribution of the final size of an epidemic in finite 
populations, which allow construction of flexible methods to analyse within-household transmission 
chains.  
We apply the method to a recent study of within-household transmission of highly pathogenic avian 
influenza of the H7N7 subtype that caused a large epidemic in poultry in the Netherlands in 2003. 
Shortly after the detection of virus circulation the Dutch authorities undertook an aggressive control 
strategy that consisted of an animal movement ban in the affected regions, tracing and screening 
suspected flocks, and culling of infected and contiguous flocks. In all, a total of 255 flocks became 
infected during a period of nine weeks, and more than 30 million birds were culled [25-26]. 
Subsequent studies of poultry workers revealed that at least 86 infections from the animal reservoir 
to humans had taken place [27-29]. In addition, more than 30 household contacts of the infected 
poultry workers that had not been in direct contact with poultry were reported positive. These reports 
indicate that human-to-human transmission did occur from individuals infected from the animal 
reservoir. 
Here we analyse data of the transmission chains in 24 households that led to 33 human-to-human 
transmission events, measuring the extent of onward transmission from humans that were infected 
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by humans (i.e. secondary human-to-human transmission). We complement the statistical analyses 
by systematic (post-hoc) power analyses to obtain insight in the study size needed to be able to find 
significant secondary human-to-human transmission given that it is present. 
Although we have applied the method to a specific dataset we believe that our method is of general 
interest as it enables rapid estimation of within-household transmission rates based on data that are 
easily gathered for most infectious diseases. For instance, our method of analysis is not restricted to 
the analysis of emerging pandemic influenza, but it can just as well be used to estimate different 
routes of within-household transmission rates of human influenza A viruses [30-32] and, importantly, 
to assess the potential effectiveness of control measures. 
 
MATERIALS AND METHODS 
Data 
Based on evidence of human-to-human transmission of H7N7 avian influenza virus that was the 
cause of the outbreak among poultry in the Netherlands [27], a retrospective cohort study was 
undertaken to determine the extent of human-to-human transmission in households of infected 
poultry workers [28-29]. Briefly, the families of 63 of 86 poultry workers who were found positive 
agreed to participate in the study. Of these, 39 households were excluded because direct contact of 
the household members with infected birds could not be ruled out. Our dataset thus contained 24 
households with a single confirmed H7N7 infected poultry worker. There were no indications of an 
age- or sex–bias in our study population, and the distribution of household sizes in our study was not 
untypical for the Dutch population [29]. In total, 33 of 56 household members of individuals who were 
classified as an index case had antibodies to H7N7 virus (Table 1), in contrast with a group of 
recently vaccinated age- and region-matched controls that were all seronegative [33]. For most of the 
individuals that were classified as positive the main symptom of infection was conjunctivitis (an 
infection of the eye), which may have been the point of entry and site of virus multiplication [27-29]. 
 
Final size distribution 
The statistical analyses are based on the distributions of the final size (the total number infected in a 
household) as a function of the household size [34-35], obtained using an SEIR epidemiological 
model in which individuals are classified as susceptible (S), latently infected (infected but not yet 
infectious)(E), infectious (I), and recovered and immune (R). No a priori assumptions are made 
regarding the duration or distribution of the latent and infectious periods. We consider a model with 
two types of individuals, and assume that there are no individuals that have prior immunity (a 
plausible assumption for an emerging pathogen). The mathematical equations determining the 
distribution of the final size of the household outbreaks are given in Text S1. 
The final size equation in Text S1 is quite general. The data of the Dutch epidemiological study are 
more specific and allow a number of simplifications in the final size equation. In particular, the 
epidemiological study focused on households in which only the initially infected individual had 
acquired the infection from the animal reservoir, while the other household members had had no 
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contact with infected poultry. We assume that type 1 individuals are infected from the animal 
reservoir and that type 2 individuals are susceptible to infection by humans. The focus in our 
analyses is on *12β , the transmission rate parameter from the person infected from the animal 
reservoir to its household members (primary human-to-human transmission), and *22β , the 
transmission rate parameter from humans that are infected by humans (secondary human-to-human 
transmission).  
 
Scenarios 
In the analyses we consider four scenarios that are defined by the assumptions regarding the 
distribution of the infectious period and the mechanism of pathogen transmission. With respect to the 
infectious period we focus on two extremes, one in which the infectious period is exponentially 
distributed (the ‘general stochastic epidemic’) and one in which the infectious period is of fixed 
duration (the ‘Reed-Frost’ model) [34-36]. 
With respect to the mechanism of virus transmission within the household we assume that 
transmission is frequency-dependent or density-dependent [37]. In a frequency-dependent model the 
number of contacts per unit of time is fixed, and the transmission rate is proportional to the relative 
frequency (prevalence) of infectious individuals. In a density-dependent model the number of 
contacts per unit of time is proportional to the number of individuals. Hence, in a frequency-
dependent model the transmission rate in a household of two individuals of which one is infectious 
equals the transmission rate in a household of four of which two are infectious. In a density-
dependent model the transmission rate in the latter household would be twice as high as in the 
former. Notice that the dimension of the transmission parameter *ijβ  of the density-dependent model 
is defined per individual per unit time, while the transmission parameter ijβ  of the frequency-
dependent model is defined per unit time. Notice furthermore that ijβ  can be interpreted as the 
expected number of type i infections that would be caused by a type j infected individual over the 
course of its infectious period in a large population of susceptibles if time is measured in units of the 
infectious period [38]. Further details are given Text S1. 
 
Statistical analysis and model selection 
With the computed final size distributions and household final size data at hand, it is straightforward 
to estimate the parameters of interest by means of maximum likelihood [30-32], and to calculate the 
corresponding confidence intervals/areas on the basis of likelihood ratio tests. 
To evaluate whether secondary human-to-human transmission has taken place, and to choose 
between models of different complexity we make use of Akaike’s Information Criterion adjusted for 
small sample size (AICc) [39]. We focus on a set of one-parameter models with no secondary 
human-to-human transmission (i.e. 0*22 =β  or 022 =β ), a set of one-parameter models with no 
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difference between primary and secondary human-to-human transmission ( *12
*
22 ββ =  or 2122 ββ = ), 
and a set of two-parameter models in which both transmission parameters are estimated. 
The difference minAICAICii −=Δ  measures the support for model i. In general, the larger iΔ , the 
less plausible the model is. The model weights or supports [ ][ ]∑ Δ− Δ−= j jiiw 5.0exp
5.0exp  can be interpreted as 
the probability that model i is the best among the ones considered [39]. 
 
Power analysis 
The size of the Dutch study that inspired our analyses was fairly small (24 households). This may be 
typical for emerging pathogens from zoonotic origins that have not (yet) acquired the ability to spread 
efficiently among humans. Therefore we performed power analyses to evaluate for which effect sizes 
(i.e. transmission rate parameter values) and study designs (i.e. number of households) secondary 
human-to-human transmission can be detected by our method. In particular, we carried out post-hoc 
power analyses of the Dutch epidemiological study taking the estimated parameter values of Table 2, 
and assuming different sizes of the epidemiological study. In addition, we used simulated datasets in 
which primary and secondary human-to-human transmission were equally efficient in order to 
determine the minimal study size that would be necessary for detection of secondary human-to-
human transmission. 
For each parameter constellation we carried out 1000 simulations and re-estimated the parameters 
of the simulated data as described in the above sections. We focused on simulated datasets that 
either contained 24 households with the household distribution as in Table 1, or on simulated 
datasets that contained a multiple of 24 households, while keeping the distribution of household 
sizes as in Table 1. 
 
Antiviral prophylaxis 
To evaluate the potential efficacy of prophylactic antiviral drug treatment we calculate household final 
size distributions and expected household outbreak sizes if all household members take antiviral 
drugs. The baseline transmission parameters are as in Table 2. Antiviral drugs reduce the 
susceptibility of uninfected individuals by a factor 1-AVES where AVES is the antiviral efficacy for 
susceptibility, and the infectiousness of infected individuals by a factor 1-AVEI where AVEI  is the 
antiviral efficacy for infectiousness [40-43]. Since all individuals infected from the animal reservoir 
were already taking antiviral prophylaxis [27-28], the transmission rate parameters '12β  and '22β  
(or *'12β  and *'22β ) in a household that is on antiviral therapy are ( ) 21'12 1 ββ SAVE−=  and 
( )( ) 22'22 11 ββ SI AVEAVE −−= , respectively. In line with previous studies [9,42-43] we assume in 
our default scenario that antiviral drug treatment reduces the susceptibility to infection weakly 
( 3.0=SAVE ), and the infectiousness once infected moderately ( 6.0=IAVE ).  
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A recent study estimated the antiviral efficacies for susceptibility to infection with illness ( SDAVE ) 
and antiviral efficacy for infectiousness at 85.0=SDAVE  and 66.0=IAVE  [40-41]. In the Results 
and Table S4 we therefore also consider scenarios with higher antiviral efficacies for susceptibility 
and infectiousness. Specifically, we have also considered 6.0=SAVE and 66.0=IAVE , i.e. 
antiviral drug treatment reduces the overall incidence of infection to a lesser extent than the 
incidence of symptomatic infection. 
 
RESULTS 
Estimation of household transmission rates 
We consider three scenarios for virus spread within a household after an introduction from the animal 
reservoir. First, we assume that all household infections are the result of transmission from the 
person originally infected by the animal reservoir (model 1). Second, we assume that there are no 
differences in the transmission rates from human cases infected by the animal reservoir and from 
human cases infected by humans (model 2). Third, we consider a model in which these human-to-
human transmission rates are estimated separately (model 3). Within each model we assume that 
transmission is either frequency-dependent or density-dependent, and that the infectious period is 
either fixed or highly variable (see Materials and methods), yielding four scenarios per model 
(models 1A-1D, models 2A-2D, and models 3A-3D). 
The results show that there is no single model or scenario that is exclusively favored by the data, 
although the density-dependent transmission scenarios fit the data considerably better than the 
frequency-dependent scenarios (Table S1). In fact, the combined support for the density-dependent 
scenarios is 83.6% versus 16.4% for the frequency-dependent scenarios. Therefore, we will from this 
point onwards focus on the density-dependent scenarios only. The results of the analyses are 
summarized in Figure 1 and Table 2. 
For the model with the highest support (model 1B) the maximum likelihood estimate of the 
transmission rate parameter for primary human-to-human transmission is 1.2 (95%CI=0.64-2.3). This 
implies that the expected numbers of human-to human infections (excluding the primary case) in 
households of sizes four and eight are 1.6 and 3.8, respectively (Table 3). For the second ranking 
model (model 3A) the transmission rate parameters for primary and secondary human-to-human 
transmission are 0.61 (0.34-1.0) and 0.21 (0.0038-0.46), and the expected numbers of human-to-
human infections in households of size four and eight are 1.7 and 5.4, respectively. 
The four models with more than 10% support can be divided in two groups. The first group consists 
of models 1B and 3B, which have a highly variable infectious period, and no (model 1B) or very little 
(model 3B) secondary human-to-human transmission. The second group contains models 2A and 
3A, which have a fixed infectious period and significant secondary transmission. Apparently, the data 
are best explained by some differentiation in within-household infectivity, either by probabilistic 
differences between the primary infecteds (models 1B and 3B) or by differences in infectivity due to 
the inclusion of secondary human-to-human transmission (models 2A and 3A). 
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The test that detects H7N7 antibodies in humans has high sensitivity and specificity [30]. 
Nevertheless, it is possible that the dataset includes a small number of false positives. To investigate 
this possibility we reanalysed the data assuming 85% test specificity. Under this assumption the 
transmission rate parameters are consistently slightly lower than in Table 2 and Table S1, but the 
results are otherwise in good agreement with our default scenario (Table S2). In addition, we 
reanalysed the data when one or both of the large households with a high proportion of test positives 
are excluded from the analyses (Table 1). The results are similar to those presented in Table 2 and 
Table S1, the trend being that the frequency-dependent transmission models now have slightly 
higher support (Table S3). 
 
Power analysis 
The above results indicate that, on the one hand, secondary human-to-human transmission is 
plausible if variation in the infectious period is limited but, on the other hand, may not be necessary if 
there is substantial variation in the infectious period. Unfortunately, there is to date not enough 
information to decide as to which model is more plausible. Therefore, to investigate to what extent 
our results are a consequence of our small study size we have carried out a number of power 
analyses.  
Figure 2 shows the results of a post-hoc power analysis of model 3B (fixed infectious period, 
separate estimation of primary and secondary human-to-human transmission) which yielded a low 
but positive rate of secondary human-to-human transmission. The top panel shows the point 
estimates of the transmission rate parameters of 1000 simulations of a population of 24 households, 
taking the estimated parameter values of Table 2 (β*21=1.1 and β*22=0.071). The analyses show that 
although 668 of 1000 simulations yield estimates of the full model with β*22>0, in the statistical 
comparison only 263 of the 1000 simulations favour a model that includes secondary human-to-
human transmission. Apparently, the more parsimonious model without secondary human-to-human 
transmission that contains only one parameter is most of the times favoured over the full model that 
does include secondary human-to-human transmission but contains two parameters. If the study size 
is increased from 24 to 96 households the number of simulations that yield estimates with β*22>0 
increases to 877 of 1000 (Figure 2, bottom panel). The number of simulations that support models 
that include secondary human-to-human transmission also increases to 381 of 1000. If the number of 
households is increased still further, the support for models that include secondary human-to-human 
transmission increases still further (results not shown).  
To further investigate the minimal study size needed to be able to distinguish primary from secondary 
human-to-human transmission in a general setting we carried out simulations assuming that primary 
and secondary human-to-human transmission are equally efficient (β*22= β*21), and estimated the 
transmission parameters as described above. The results are summarized in Figure 3. If there is very 
little human-to-human transmission there are few infection events in the households and our method 
yields low support (57%) for models that include secondary human-to-human transmission (model 1, 
no secondary transmission: 43%; model 2, equal primary and secondary transmission: 43%; full 
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model: 14%). If the efficiency of human-to-human transmission is increased the support for models 
that include secondary human-to-human transmission increases, especially for the model with a fixed 
infectious period. For the model with a fixed infectious period the highest support is 98% at β*22= 
β*21=0.6 (individual-1 * infectious period-1), while for the model with an exponentially distributed 
infectious period it is 91% at β*22= β*21=1.4 (individual-1 * infectious period-1). If human-to-human 
transmission is very efficient most household members are infected, and the method has difficulties 
distinguishing between primary and secondary human-to-human transmission. As a consequence, 
the support for models that include secondary human-to-human transmission decreases with 
increasing human-to-human transmissibility if human-to-human transmissibility is already efficient.  
 
Antiviral prophylaxis 
During the Dutch outbreak of H7N7 influenza virus in poultry prophylactic treatment with the antiviral 
drug oseltamivir was given to poultry workers but not to their household members. Given the 
observation of considerable within-household human-to-human transmission, consideration should 
be given to offering prophylactic treatment with antiviral drugs to all household members of a person 
at risk of infection. The natural question is to ask how effective such a strategy would have been, 
given estimates of household transmission parameters (Table 2) and parameters determining the 
efficacy of antiviral drugs [9,40-43]. 
For the Dutch study population (Table 1) the expected numbers of household infections for the three 
most plausible models and parameter estimates of Table 2 are 30.3 (model 1B), 32.7 (model 3A), 
and 30.1 (model 2A). This corresponds well with the actual number of household infections (33) in 
the dataset of Table 1. Recalculating the expected number of household infections using 
conservative estimates of the antiviral efficacies for susceptibility and infectiousness (AVES=0.3 and 
AVEI=0.6) [9,42-43] yields expected numbers of household infections of 25.3 (model 1B), 21.5 
(model 3A), and 21.8 (model 2A). If antiviral prophylaxis is assumed to be more effective (AVES=0.6 
and AVEI=0.66) [40-41] the expected numbers of household infections are 18.0 (model 1B), 12.9 
(model 3A), and 11.7 (model 2A). Hence, for the Dutch study prophylactic treatment would have 
been able to prevent 5-11 of the more than 30 household infections if antiviral drugs are moderately 
efficacious, and 12-20 household infections if the efficacy of antiviral drugs is higher. 
Table 3 shows the results of a systematic analysis of the efficacy of prophylactic antiviral treatment 
for households of size four and eight. The analyses show that the number of human-to-human 
infections can be decreased to some extent by targeted antiviral therapy, although it is unlikely that 
all household infections can be prevented. In Table 3 we have assumed that antiviral drug treatment 
reduces susceptibility and infectiousness moderately. In Table S4 we investigate the robustness of 
the results of Table 3 by increasing the antiviral efficacies for susceptibility and infectiousness. The 
analyses in Table S4 show that the number of household infections decreases with increasing 
antiviral efficacy for susceptibility or infectiousness. Still, it is unlikely that all household infections can 
be prevented. We conclude that complete prevention of close-contact infections with current antiviral 
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drugs is probably not within reach, at least not for the H7N7 avian influenza virus that caused the 
outbreak in poultry in the Netherlands, and that was the cause of dozens of human infections. 
 
DISCUSSION 
We have presented a method to quantify different routes of transmission of avian influenza virus in 
human households, and applied the method to an epidemiological study that was carried out after a 
large outbreak of H7N7 avian influenza virus in poultry in the Netherlands. Although the size of the 
study is relatively small, it is the most detailed investigation of household transmission of avian 
influenza virus thus far and therefore forms a good starting point to evaluate methods aimed at 
quantifying human-to-human transmission of avian influenza viruses. Households in which additional 
bird-to-human transmission could not be ruled out were excluded in order to be able to focus on 
different routes of human-to-human transmission solely. The methods, however, are also applicable 
to the situation where the source of the human infections (animal or human) is not known. 
The ability of our method to distinguish between primary and secondary human-to-human 
transmission is determined by the distribution of the final size within households. If secondary 
human-to-human transmission is efficient (i.e. such that it can lead to a sustained chain of infections 
in sufficiently large populations of susceptibles) epidemiological theory informs that the final size 
distribution is expected to be bimodal [38], while if there is no or little secondary human-to-human 
transmission the final size distribution is expected to remain unimodal (see Text S1 for details). As 
the power analyses have shown our method works best for intermediate transmission rates, since 
then the difference between scenarios with reproduction numbers smaller and higher than 1 is most 
pronounced. This also explains the difference in Figure 3 between the models assuming a fixed or 
exponentially distributed infectious period, as the probability of a minor outbreak is, for a fixed value 
of the reproduction number, smaller if the infectious period is of fixed duration than if it is 
exponentially distributed [34]. Given these results it would be interesting to know the actual 
distribution of the infectious period of avian influenza viruses in humans. Unfortunately, for avian 
influenza virus infections in humans very little is known about the duration and the distribution of the 
duration of the infectious period. For human influenza viruses more is known about the duration of 
the infectious period. For instance, a detailed analysis of H3N2 human influenza virus data indicated 
that the mean infectious period was about 4 days, with very little variation around the mean [44]. At 
present, however, it is unclear if and how these results of human-adapted strains can be translated 
to strains that are not (yet) adapted for transmission from human to human. 
Our post-hoc power analyses furthermore indicate that if secondary human-to-human transmission is 
fairly inefficient (i.e. if β*22 is small enough so that no prolonged infection chain is possible in a large 
population of susceptibles) it can still be detected using fairly small studies that contain a few dozens 
of households (e.g., n=96 in Figure 2). If, however, secondary human-to-human transmission is very 
inefficient larger study sizes are needed, probably containing several hundreds of households, to 
unequivocally demonstrate the existence of secondary human-to-human transmission. Of course, 
interesting as the quantification of inefficient secondary human-to-human transmission may be from 
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a scientific point of view, it may not be a pressing problem from a public health perspective. In other 
words, our method is well-suited to detect animal pathogens that are on the verge of obtaining the 
ability for continued spread in humans. 
Our general power analyses in Figure 3 also have shown that our model is able to detect efficient 
secondary human-to-human transmission already with very small study sizes (e.g., n=24 in Figure 3). 
Perhaps surprisingly, the method works best when transmission rates are intermediate, because 
then the difference between models that include or exclude secondary human-to-human 
transmission is most pronounced. It would be interesting to investigate whether these type of 
phenomena also are observed in other and more general two-type epidemic models for the spread of 
pathogens within households [21-23]. 
For the Dutch outbreak our results show that there is some but no conclusive evidence of secondary 
human-to-human virus transmission. In fact, the combined support for the four models that exclude 
secondary human-to-human transmission (models 1A-1D) is 39.8%, while the combined support for 
the eight models that do include secondary human-to-human transmission (models 2A-2D and 3A-
3D) is only 60.2% (Table S1). In addition, the model with the highest individual support (model 1B) 
has a support of 29.9% and does not include secondary transmission (Table S1). Moreover, if both 
transmission parameters are estimated separately (models 3A-3D) the estimates of secondary 
human-to-human transmission are consistently much lower than the estimates of primary human-to-
human transmission. These results suggest that humans infected by animals transmit the virus fairly 
efficiently to other humans, but that humans infected by other humans do not efficiently pass the 
virus on to other humans. 
It is tempting to speculate that the observed differences between primary and secondary human-to-
human transmission are due to a dose effect, i.e. that humans infected by humans had been infected 
with a lower number of virus particles than humans who were infected by poultry. Unfortunately, 
independent evidence of the ‘degree of infection’ that could corroborate this suggestion is lacking. An 
alternative explanation that could conceivably explain the observed differences between primary and 
secondary human-to-human transmission would involve changes in behavior whereby people 
become more careful in preventing risky contacts after the index case shows signs of illness. Again, 
evidence validating or falsifying this possibility is lacking. Finally, it is often assumed that the 
transmissibility of a newly arising pathogen will increase over time as more individuals are infected, 
allowing the pathogen to adapt to the new host species [20]. However, if anything our analyses have 
shown that secondary human-to-human transmission is less efficient than primary human-to-human 
transmission, in contrast with conventional wisdom. A possibility that is invariably overlooked is that 
within-host selection of avian influenza viruses in human hosts does not select for higher but rather 
for lower transmissibility. Theoretical studies focusing on evolution of the dispersal rate in a 
metapopulation context indicate that this is a theoretical possibility [45]. Studies with ferrets focusing 
on the transmissibility of H5N1 avian influenza virus have begun to unravel the complex evolutionary 
pathways of this virus [17-18]. 
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Our analyses indicate that the benefit of giving antiviral drugs to household members of an infected 
individual in terms of reducing the number of infections would have been modest. In fact, for the 
study population of Table 1 the results show that the number of household infections could have 
been decreased from more than 30 to 22-25 if antiviral drugs are moderately effective and to 12-18 if 
antiviral drugs are more effective. This is due to the fact that antiviral drugs provide only partial 
protection against infection and shedding, while the estimate of the transmission rate of primary 
human-to-human transmission is relatively high. If the baseline transmission parameters are 
decreased the potential effectiveness of antiviral treatment increases (results not shown), in line with 
the observation that control measures usually are most effective whenever the basic reproduction 
number is close to 1 [9,38,43]. Alternatively, if the baseline transmission parameters are increased 
the effectiveness of antiviral prophylaxis decreases. 
Although our analyses suggest that antiviral drugs are only moderately effective in reducing the 
number of household infections, we do not intend to suggest that antiviral drug treatment should or 
should not be used as prophylaxis against avian influenza viruses. In fact, it may well be that even 
though prophylactic antiviral drug treatment is only moderately effective in preventing the number of 
human infections, it may still be quite effective in reducing the disease symptoms of individuals who 
are infected [40-41]. On the other hand, it is also possible that by reducing the disease symptoms 
individuals who are infected will in effect be more infectious because they are less likely to remain 
bedridden. Studies quantifying the relation between disease and infectiousness (i.e. viral titers in the 
upper respiratory tract) are desperately needed to answer this question. 
Finally, with the number of H5N1 infections in humans accumulating at a steady pace, it is important 
to keep track of the ability of this virus to enhance its transmissibility in humans [7]. At present, 
however, there is still a conspicuous lack of data pertaining to the possibility of human-to-human 
spread of H5N1 viruses. In our opinion, detailed investigations of infected individuals as well as 
tracing and investigation of the individuals in close contact with a confirmed case should become an 
integral part of the handling of each human H5N1 infection. 
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household size number 
infected 2 3 4 5 7 8 
1 8 0 1 0 0 0 
2 4 0 2 0 0 0 
3  1 1 2 0 0 
4   3 0 0 0 
5    0 0 1 
6     0 0 
7     1 0 
8      0 
number of 
households 12 1 7 2 1 1 
Table 1. Overview of the household final size infection data of highly pathogenic H7N7 avian 
influenza virus that caused a major outbreak among poultry in the Netherlands in 2003.  
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model parameter estimate  (95% CI) 
Akaike information 
criterion (AICc) 
% support 
1A β*21=0.89 (0.61-1.2) 57.15 10.2 
no
 s
ec
on
da
ry
 
tra
ns
m
is
si
on
 
1B β*21=1.2 (0.64-2.3) 54.64 35.8 
2A β*22=0.40 (0.27-0.56) 56.34 15.3 
eq
ua
l p
rim
ar
y 
an
d 
se
co
nd
ar
y 
tra
ns
m
is
si
on
 
2B β*22=0.51 (0.30-0.85) 59.21 3.6 
3A β*21=0.61 (0.34-1.0) β*22=0.21 (0.0038-0.46) 55.54 22.8 
fu
ll 
m
od
el
 
3B β*21=1.1 (0.46-2.2) β*22=0.071 (0-0.51) 56.81 12.1 
Table 2. Maximum likelihood estimates of the transmission rate parameters of the models described 
in the text. Models 1A, 2A, and 3A assume an infectious period of fixed duration, while models 1B, 
2B, and 3B assume an exponentially distributed infectious period.  
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no treatment  antiviral treatment  model 
N=4  N=8 N=4  N=8  
1A 1.8 (0.07) 4.1 (0.00) 1.4 (0.15) 3.3 (0.13) 
no
 s
ec
on
da
ry
 
tra
ns
m
is
si
on
 
1B 1.6 (0.22) 3.8 (0.11) 1.4 (0.29) 3.2 (0.15) 
2A 1.5 (0.30) 5.9 (0.06) 1.0 (0.43) 4.5 (0.14) 
eq
ua
l p
rim
ar
y 
an
d 
se
co
nd
ar
y 
tra
ns
m
is
si
on
 
2B 1.4 (0.40) 4.7 (0.22) 1.0 (0.48) 3.8 (0.29) 
3A 1.7 (0.16) 5.4 (0.01) 1.1 (0.28) 3.1 (0.05) 
fu
ll 
m
od
el
 
3B 1.6 (0.24) 4.1 (0.12) 1.3 (0.31) 3.1 (0.16) 
Table 3. The expected outbreak size and probability of no human-to-human transmission (number 
between brackets) in households of sizes four and eight, respectively. Parameter values are as in 
Table 2. The primary infection is not included in the household outbreak size. The columns under the 
heading ‘household antiviral treatment’ give the expected household final size if all household 
members take antiviral drugs. The antiviral efficacies for susceptibility (AVES) and infectiousness 
(AVEI) are AVES=0.3 and AVEI=0.6, respectively. See Table S4 for additional analyses. 
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Figure legends.  
 
Figure 1. Maximum likelihood estimates of the transmission rate parameters for the model 3A (top 
panel) and model 3B (bottom panel) described in the text (black dots), with contours of the 90%, 
95%, and 99% confidence areas. The maximum likelihood parameter estimates of models that 
exclude secondary human-to-human transmission (β*22=0, models 1A and 1B), and that assume 
equal primary and secondary human-to-human transmission (β*22= β*21, models 2A and 2B) are also 
indicated (grey dots).  
 
Figure 2. Post-hoc power analysis of model 3B (i.e. assuming an exponentially distributed infectious 
period). The top panel (n=24) shows the parameter estimates of 1000 simulated outbreaks in a 
population of 24 households with size distribution as in Table 1 and with the parameter values as 
estimated in Table 2. The bottom panel (n=96) shows the results of the analyses in case that the 
number of households is increased fourfold. 
 
Figure 3.  Average support for models that include secondary human-to-human transmission for 
1000 simulated datasets of 24 households with equal primary and secondary human-to-human 
transmission (β*22= β*21). The ordinate shows the combined support for the one-parameter model 
with β*22= β*21 (model 2) and the two-parameter model in which β*21 and β*22 are estimated separately 
(model 3). Black dots refer to simulations with a fixed infectious period, and open dots represents 
simulations with an exponentially distributed infectious period. 
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Captions for the online material.  
 
Text S1. Supplementary methods. 
 
Table S1. Overview of parameter estimates for the models described in the Materials and Methods. 
 
Table S2. Overview of parameter estimates in case of an imperfect serological test. 
 
Table S3. Overview of parameter estimates in case that two outlier households are excluded from 
the analyses. 
 
Table S4. Overview of the estimated effectiveness of antiviral prophylaxis in households of size four 
and eight. 



